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Since the spectacular collapse of US 
energy giant Enron Corporation in 2001, and 
subsequently its audit ﬁrm Arthur Andersen, 
audit companies have faced increasing pressure 
to remain unbiased and independent of their 
clients. However, a growing public concern is the 
impact of non-audit services offered by audit 
ﬁrms on their independence.
Non-audit services include compliance-
related services such as taxation and accounting 
advice, as well as assurance-related services like 
due diligence, explains Professor Lim Chee Yeow 
of SMU’s School of Accountancy. “The proﬁt 
margin of non-audit services is much higher than 
for audit work, and in the US, audit ﬁrms earn 
much more from non-audit services than from 
audit services,” he says.
Because of this, regulators are increasingly 
concerned that the provision of non-audit 
services could end up compromising auditor 
independence, and US regulators have even 
moved to ban the provision of certain non-audit 
services by auditors.
Professor Lim is interested to ﬁnd out if this 
ban is indeed warranted. He describes a key 
question of his research, “Does the provision of 
non-audit services, particularly by the expert 
auditors, affect the independence of auditors and 
the quality of their audit work?”
NON-AUDIT SERVICES AND  
AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
He outlines two opposing points of view. On the 
one hand, auditors who are attracted to the 
lucrative income from non-audit services may 
give in to client demands, thus compromising 
their independence. “Bonding between the 
auditor and the client could become too close, 
particularly with the provision of non-audit 
services,” Professor Lim says.
On the other hand, by providing non-audit 
services, auditors may get a deeper understanding 
of the ﬁrm they are auditing. “Conversely, non-
audit services allow the audit ﬁrm to better 
understand the client, their operations and their 
business model, which means they are better able 
to audit the company. This is known as the 
knowledge spillover effect,” he says.
To ﬁnd out which hypothesis was backed by 
data, Professor Lim examined audit-related data 
available from the Audit Analytics database. He 
ﬁrst identiﬁed ‘expert auditors’ in a wide range 
of industries, deﬁned by the market share within 
their respective industries. “Expert auditors care 
very much about their reputation and about their 
exposure to potential litigation. These ﬁrms also 
have deep knowledge about their industry 
norms and accounting rules.”
Professor Lim explains that several other 
studies have found no relation between the 
provision of non-audit services and audit quality. 
However, he discovered in his research that for 
these companies, the provision of non-audit 
services by the expert auditors led to an increase 
in the quality of their audit.
He also examined how auditor quality 
matters in countries with varying levels of 
investor and legal protection. This is particularly 
important for companies and investors 
interested in putting money into developing 
countries where the legal environment may be 
weak. To address this issue, he examined 
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discretionary accruals, a common ﬁnancial 
reporting measure of audit quality.
“We found that when the legal environment 
is strong, when investors are already well 
protected, the auditor quality is not that 
important. But when the legal environment 
and investor protection is weak, the beneﬁt of 
hiring the best quality auditors is highest.” He 
explains that this meant companies moving 
into developing countries would do well in 
engaging a higher quality auditor.
THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL CULTURE ON 
FINANCIAL REPORTING
While formal institutions such as a strong legal 
system affect accounting and audit practices, 
Professor Lim is also interested in how informal 
institutions such as national culture may affect 
the ﬁnancial reporting. “The reason why I’m 
interested in the ‘softer’ aspects of this ﬁeld is 
because there haven’t been many studies in 
this area and because culture is intangible and 
difficult to measure.”
He looked at differences in culture and how 
these affected accounting conservatism as well 
as risk-taking behaviour. He used two measures 
of cultural differences developed by Dutch 
social psychologist Geert Hofstede: firstly, 
individualism or how individualistic a person or a 
society is, and secondly, uncertainty avoidance, 
which refers to appetite for risk.
“Our hypothesis is that if a society is more 
individualistic, then risk-taking increases and 
financial reporting is less conservative. 
If uncertainty avoidance is high, risk-taking 
decreases and financial reporting is more 
conservative.” Professor Lim said that overall, the 
data examined was consistent with their 
hypothesis, showing the importance of culture 
on accounting and risk.
“Our work shows that ﬁnancial reporting is 
affected not only by formal institutions but 
informal institutions also have ﬁrst-order effects 
on aspects such as risk-taking and accounting 
conservatism,” he says.
“Following the ﬁnancial crisis, many regulators 
are now concerned about risk-taking. The 
thinking is to have more regulations to prevent 
banks from being too aggressive in taking 
risks. But our research shows that apart from 
formal measures to control risk-taking, 
fundamental cultural aspects play an important 
role in determining risky behaviour. Regulation 
is not everything.”
Following on from his work into the link 
between national culture and ﬁnancial reporting, 
Professor Lim is studying the correlation between 
social trust and tax avoidance. He draws data 
from the World Values Survey, a global project 
that measures trust among people as well as 
trust between citizens and the government, 
and how they change over time.
“Tax avoidance is a particularly important 
issue because regulators are concerned about 
the loss of government revenue. Our basic 
ﬁnding is that if trust is high within the society, 
managers are likely to conform to social norms 
and refrain from actions that may betray the trust 
placed on them by the society, so they are more 
likely to pay their share of taxes,” he says. 
